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The paper shows that a matching model where technological change is partially
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11 Introduction
Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2003) have documented that the standard labor
market matching model has problems in explaining the uctuations of unemployment and
vacancies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether these problems can be
solved by adopting a somewhat dierent specication of technical progress. Standard
RBC models, including the basic versions of the Mortensen/Pissarides model, assume
that changes in aggregate productivity aect equally all rms and production processes.
An alternative view with long tradition is that technical progress is embodied in new
investment goods, and that only the new capital vintages enjoy the increase in productivity.
In this paper I investigate the hypothesis that technical change is embodied, at least
partially, in the match between a rm and a worker. What motivates this change in the
specication of technology is the view that a boom is a time that oers many opportunities
to rms. Many new ideas are around, new products and new markets are created, and
rms strive to be the rst in implementing ideas and conquer a share of the new markets.
Even after entering a recession, where new ideas are scarce, the jobs that were created
during good times keep a part of their productivity advantage. We can summarize this
idea in the following
Hypothesis 1. In the cross section of jobs that exist at any given point in time, the
jobs that have been created in a boom have on average higher total factor productivity
(keeping quality of labor and the capital stock xed) than the jobs that have been created in
a recession.
This view of technology has some similarity to investment-specic technology shocks,
which Fisher (2006) nds to have an important role in explaining business cycle uctu-
ations. An investment specic shock is embodied in the capital that is created while
technology is favourable. In our case, the shock is embodied in the quality of the em-
ployment relationships. To have the most parsimonious representation of this idea, I will
assume in this paper that there is only one aggregate technology shock, and that labor
productivity takes the following form:
Y (z;zm) = (1   z)z + zzm; 0  z  1 (1)
Here, z is the current level of aggregate productivity, and zm is the level of aggregate
productivity prevailing at the time when the match was formed. The technological spec-
ication in standard RBC models is a special case of (1), where z = 0. For z > 0,
technological change is partially \embodied" in the match. Note that I abstract from
capital in production, following most of the labor market matching literature,
The consequences of the specication (1) in a standard matching model were briey
investigated in Costain and Reiter (2003, Section 4.4), and it was found that it can lead to
a substantial increase in the variability of unemployment.1 The intuition is the following. If
1Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2006) embed labor market frictions into a model where technical
progress is embodied in capital investment. They only analyze steady states, and it is not clear whether
the mechanism investigated in the present paper would be at work there as well.
2a new match is formed in a boom, the high productivity is partially embodied in the match,
and will persist even if a recession comes. The possibility that a recession may arrive while
the match continues, reduces the outside option of the worker, while the outside option of
the rm is always zero. This tends to increase the fraction of the product of labor going
to the rm, and hence the value of a match to the rm uctuates more strongly over the
cycle. This creates bigger uctuations in vacancies, hiring and unemployment. On the
negative side, it was found that this model creates a grossly counterfactual variability of
wages. In this paper, I choose a recently developed version of the matching model with
long-term wage contracts (Rudanko 2005), to see whether this combination can explain
both the dynamics of unemployment, vacancies etc., and the dynamics of wages. Since
the cyclicality of wages is hard to measure, I will use both macro- and microeconometric
evidence to evaluate the success of the model.
It is probably dicult to test Hypothesis 1 or the specication (1) directly, because of
composition bias in the workforce over the cycle, eects of changes in the capital stock and
other issues. I interpret the evidence in Bowlus (1995) as supportive of Hypothesis 1. She
nds that jobs that are created in recessions pay lower wages and dissolve more quickly
than jobs created in booms. Moreover, \... the impact on tenure is greater for higher-
educated workers and those employed in professional industries. This evidence suggests
the cyclical phenomenon is one of general mismatching and not of workers taking stopgap
jobs during recessions to get by." (Bowlus 1995, p.347). If the jobs created in recessions
had the same productivity as jobs created in booms, and the wage dierential was only a
consequence of wage contracting, we would expect workers to renegotiate their wages when
the boom arrives, but not to change the employer.
The aim of this paper is to test Hypothesis 1 in an indirect way. We will see that
putting the specication (1) into a labor market matching model has strong implications
for labor market aggregates and for real wages, which can be tested against macro and
micro data. The results are largely favourable. The model goes a long way in explaining the
high variability of unemployment and of labor market tightness over the cycle, in contrast
to matching models with a standard RBC technology. With long-term wage contracting
as in Rudanko (2005), the model's implications for wages are mostly consistent with the
data.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 looks
at the case of continuous Nash bargaining, for which results can be derived analytically.
Section 4 briey describes the data that the model is supposed to match, and discusses
parameter choices. The main results are in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Details of
the computational procedures are given in an appendix that can be downloaded from
\http://www.econ.upf.es/reiter/research.html".
2 Model
The model I use is very similar to Rudanko (2005). The main dierence is the more general
technology specication (1), while Rudanko works with the traditional RBC formulation
3(z = 0). This has some consequences for the contracting problem of workers and rms.
The economy is populated by a unit mass of workers. Workers order consumption
streams according to the utility function Et
P1
i=0 iU(ct+i). The concavity of U implies
risk aversion, but we assume that workers do not have access to the capital market; they
can neither borrow nor save.2 Therefore, their consumption equals their wage wt while
employed, and the constant b while unemployed. We will refer to b as \unemployment
benets", but following most of the matching literature, we eectively treat it like home
production. This means in particular that we do not take into account that b has to be
nanced by a government through taxes etc.
A rm is a lled job. It employs one worker and produces output according to the
production function (1). In each period, the rm becomes permanently unproductive with
probability . In this case, the match dissolves and the worker becomes unemployed.
Whenever a match separates, either endogenously or exogenously, we assume that the
vacancy (the rm) disappears. This is not an innocuous assumption in our setup, and we
discuss in Section 2.5 what happens if we modify it. We assume that rms are owned by
risk neutral entrepreneurs, but we eectively ignore the entrepreneurs in the analysis of the
model (they consume prots in every period, and we do not worry about their consumption
being positive or not). The asymmetry between risk-neutral entrepreneurs and risk averse
workers provides an incentive to long-term wage contracting where rms insure workers
against wage uctuations.
2.1 Matching Technology
The measure of unemployed workers is denoted by U, and the measure of open vacancies




We dene labor market tightness as  = V
U. Then we can write the probability of a rm
to ll the vacancy as pF = M
V = Am  and the probability of a worker to nd a job as
pW = M
U = pF = Am1 .
2.2 Short-Term Wage Contracts
We rst consider the case that is closest to the standard Mortensen/Pissarides model.
Denote by F (z;zm) the value of a lled job to the rm, and by V (z;zm) the value of a
job to the worker. They are both a function of the current state of productivity z and the
productivity of the time when the match was formed, zm. The value of being unemployed
is denoted by V u(z) and depends only on current technology.
2This assumption, in particular the part that households cannot save, is overly strong and is only
made to keep the contracting problem of workers and rms tractable. Beaudry and Pages (2001) give a
calibration where it is an equilibrium outcome that workers do not save.
4In the states (z;zm) where there is a positive match surplus and the match is continued,
we have




F (z;zm) = Y (z;zm)   w(z;zm) + (1   )Ez F (z
0;zm) (4)
Under the productivity specication (1), however, the match surplus is not always positive,
so that there is the possibility of endogenous separation. If z > zm, the match has lower
productivity than the new matches that are currently created, and it may be better for the
rm and the worker to separate. In fact, the evidence reported by Bowlus (1995) indicates
that this does in fact happen. Nevertheless, we will see later that if this happens too often,
the model generates some dynamics that are clearly at odds with the aggregate data. We
therefore have to put a mechanism into the model to dampen or eliminate endogenous
separations, and the easiest way to do this is a sunk cost M that has to be paid directly
after the match is formed. Since the worker has no access to the capital market, this
cost can only be paid by the rm. The Nash-bargaining is then about the match surplus
minus the sunk cost. That means we assume away the hold-up problem that comes with
the sunk cost: the worker does not appropriate the initial investment made by the rm.
With short-term contracts, the wage is continuously re-bargained, and the following Nash
bargaining conditions has to hold in each period during the match:
(F (z;zm)   M)u
0(w(z;zm)) = (1   )(V (z;zm)   V
u(z)) (5)
The rm value F (z;zm) is always understood as value after paying the sunk cost. We
use in (5) that the outside option of the rm is always zero. This is because vacancies
disappear after a match is separated, and new vacancies can be freely created such that a
zero prot condition holds, see Equ. (12).
2.3 Long-Term Wage Contracts
We will see in Section 5 that the model with continuous re-bargaining creates excessive
volatility of wages compared to the data. This problem is the more severe the bigger is
the embodied part of technological change. We therefore investigate whether a model with
long-term wage contracts can bring the model in line with the data.
We now assume that worker and rm sign a wage contract at the beginning of the
employment relationship. A contract that is signed in period t species a sequence of
wage payments wt+i(zt+i), i = 0;1;:::. Each wage is conditional on the history of shocks
zt;t+i = (zt;zt+1;:::;zt+i). No wage payments can be made after the separation of the
match.
Worker and rm choose a contract that is privately ecient (that means, it is impossible
to make both rm and worker better o). The set of ecient contracts can be characterized
by the rm's expected prot function F (V;z;zm;V u(:)). It is a function of the current state
of technology z, the technology at the time the match was formed, zm, and the expected
value that the rm has promised to the worker, V . We treat V here as a choice parameter
5of the rm; the higher V , the lower will be the prot that the rm can earn from the
employment relationship. The rm's prot function also depends on the outside option of
the worker in the dierent states of nature, V u(:). Note that, once rm and worker have
separated, the only relevant state variable is current technology z. The outside option is
therefore a function of z only, V u(z). For notational simplicity, we suppress this argument
and simply write F (v;z;zm).
The rm's prot function under limited commitment satises the functional equation
F (v;z;zm) = max
w;V (z0)















0;zm)  0; 8z
0 (6d)
The inequality (6c) is the condition that the worker wants to continue in the match.
Inequality (6d) is the analogue for the rm. In the case of one-sided commitment, only
the participation constraint of the worker, (6c), not the participation constraint of the
rm, (6d), is enforced. In the case of full (two-sided) commitment, neither (6c) nor (6d)
are imposed. Rudanko (2005, Section 2) derives some properties of optimal contracts. In
particular, the wage stays constants over the match as long as no participation constraint
binds. If, for example, the constraint (6c) starts binding, the rm has to increase the wage
to keep the worker within the rm. In the full-commitment case, the wage is constant over
the life of the match.
Just as in the case of short-term contracts, the issue of endogenous separation arises.
It may be that there is no way to satisfy (6c) and (6d). With one-sided commitment, the
contract that guarantees the worker her outside option may imply a negative value for
the rm. In those cases, a Pareto-ecient solution implies to separate the match. This
requires some modication of the above setup. However, I do not go into the details here.
because the numerical experiments below for the case of long-term wage contracts will use
a value of the sunk cost M such that all matches are continued.
It remains to determine which of the contracts on the eciency frontier is chosen. We
assume that, when rms and workers are matched in the aggregate state z, they chose the
optimal contract with the entry value V e (z) that maximizes the Nash product3
V




 (F (v;z;z)   M)
1  (7)
The rst order condition for (7) is then
 
F (V e (z);z;z)   M
@F (V e (z);z;z)=@V
= (1   )(V
e (z)   V
u(z)) (8)
3Rudanko (2005, Prop. 2.4) starts from a framework of competitive search and shows that the equilib-
rium is the same as with Nash bargaining where the bargaining weight of the worker equals the elasticity
of matches w.r.t. unemployment. For our purposes, we can start right away with the Nash bargaining
framework.
6Because of the envelope condition






we can write (8) as
(F
e (z)   M)u
0(w
e(z)) = (1   )(V
e (z)   V
u(z)) (10)
which is analogous to (5).
2.4 Labor Market Clearing
To close the model, notice that the outside option of the worker satises
V













Vacancy creation by rms is governed by the zero-prot condition
p
F((z))(F
e (z)   M) =  (12)
Equs. (11) and (12) are valid in all the contracting environments we consider.
2.5 The persistence of vacancies
If z > 0, the labor productivity of a match depends not only on the current state of
aggregate productivity (z), but also on the level of productivity when the match was
formed (zm). Consider a match where zm > z, which is more productive than a match
created in the current period. Imagine that the worker and the rm separate because
they fail to come to an agreement on the wage. This never happens in equilibrium, but
out-of-equilibrium behavior is important for the negotation process. If the rm lls the
job with a new worker, does the productivity advantage of the match persist or not? In
the rst case, we could say that embodied technology is job-specic, in the second case it
is match-specic. So far we have assumed it is match-specic, what changes if we make
it job-specic? In that case, the voluntary separation between rm and worker (out of
equilibrium) can create a vacancy with positive value. This aects the Nash bargaining
outcome, because the outside option of the rm is not zero any longer, but equals the value
of the vacancy.
I have modied the model so as to account for this possitibility, and run some numerical
experiments with the model of continuous re-bargaining. It turns out that job-specic
technology has some eect on the dynamics of wages, but very little eect on the dynamics
of unemployment, for the following reason. At the time when the rm and the worker rst
meet, the value of the vacancy is zero, because of (12), no matter whether the vacancy may
become valuable later or not. Since the match never separates endogenously in equilibrium,
the surplus at the time of the match formation, which is what determines hiring incentives,
is not aected by whether the vacancy may be valuable later on. The question of job-specic
technology may become more important if workers and rm can separate for reasons other
than the destruction of the job (for example, because a worker moves to a dierent city).
73 The Eects of Embodied Technical Change
Before presenting numerical results of the model, I want to analyze the eects of the
technology specication (1) in the standard model of continuous Nash bargaining, for
which approximate results can be derived analytically. To simplify the algebra, I write the
model in continuous time, and I choose Am = 1 and  = 0:5 in the matching function
(2) and in the bargaining function (10). There are only two aggregate productivity states
zc 2 fzgood;zbadg. Productivity switches between the two states at the rate of probability
. Then we get the set of Bellman equations
rV (zc;zm) = w(zc;zm) + (V
u(zc)   V (zc;zm)) + (V (z6c;zm)   V (zc;zm)) (13a)
rV
u(zc) = b + p




rF (zc;zm) = Y (zc;zm)   w(zc;zm) + (0   F (zc;zm)) + (F (z6c;zm)   F (zc;zm)) (13c)




where z6c denotes the state that is not zc. Dening the worker's surplus as S(zc;zm) 
V (zc;zm)   V u(zc) and using pW(zc) = 1=pF(zc), we can condense (13) to
(r +  + )S(zc;zm) + p
W(S(zc;zc))S(zc;zc)   S(z6c;zm) = w(zc;zm)   b (14a)
(r +  + )S(zc;zm)   S(z6c;zm) = Y (zc;zm)   w(zc;zm) (14b)
Adding (14a) and (14b) we obtain an equation dening the surplus:
2(r +  + )S(zc;zm) + p
W(S(zc;zc))S(zc;zc)   2S(z6c;zm) = Y (zc;zm)   b (15)
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where the asterisk denotes steady state values, and the subscripts 'c' and 'm' denote partial
derivatives with respect to current and match-time productivity.
Next we derive a linear approximation of (15) at the steady state. Assume that
(zgood;zbad) = 1  z such that
dz6c
dzc =  1. Dierentiating (15) w.r.t. zc and zm at the
steady state and using (16) gives










c = 1   z (17)




m = z (18)
Notice that the derivative of pW(S(zc;zc))S(zc;zc) w.r.t. S(zc;zm) equals pW(S)+
dpW
dS S =
2pW(S). A higher surplus has two benets for the worker. First, if she gets the job, it
8has more value. Second, the probability of getting the job increases, because the rm
surplus in equilibrium rises proportionally to the worker surplus, and therefore the number
of vacancies and the job nding probability rise.
Adding (17) and (18) and using (16b) we get














(r + ) + 2z
2(r + )
(19)






r +  + 2z
r + =U + 2
(20)
Inspecting (20), we learn two important things. First, the responsiveness of the job nding
rate to changes in labor productivity,
dpW
dzc , increases in z. Second, this eect is stronger if
 is higher (relative to r and ): the faster the aggregate state changes, the more important
it becomes for a rm in the good state to lock in the high productivity by creating new
jobs. This comes from the term 2S
m in (19). A higher  means a higher probability
of switching to the bad state, which deteriorates the outside option of the worker. This
increases the part of the productivity gain of zm that goes to the rm.
What does the model imply for wages? Subtracting (14b) from (14a) we obtain
2w(zc;zm) = Y (zc;zm) + b + p
W(S(zc;zc))S(zc;zc) (21)
Taking derivatives we get







2wm = z (23)
For the entry wage we we get
dwe
dz


































+ (1   b)
pW
zc (24)









pW and used again that pW >>
r + . Equ. (24) shows that the variability of entry wages depends on the product of the
instantaneous match surplus (1 b) and the elasticity pW
zc . If (1 b) is small, wages cannot
uctuate very strongly because they are tied to productivity. If pW
zc is high, wages tend to
uctuate a lot, because the changes in job nding probability make the outside option of
the worker uctuate. Existing specications of the matching model have moderate wage
uctuations because either pW
zc is small (Shimer 2005) or 1   b is small (Hagedorn and
Manovskii 2005) or the real wage is assumed to be rigid (Hall 2005). Our model allows
both pW
zc and 1   b to be big, and wage uctuations can become very strong.
94 Data and calibration
4.1 The cyclicality of labor market aggregates
Table 1, which is reproduced4 from Shimer (2005, Table 1), provides statistics about quar-
terly US labor market aggregates from 1951{2003. The key nding is the very high
Table 1: Summary Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1951{2003
Unempl. Vac.  pW z
StDev 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.020
Quart.Autocorr. 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.878
U 1 0.894 0.971 0.949 0.408
V 1 0.975 0.897 0.364
Corr.Matrix  1 0.948 0.396
pW 1 0.396
z 1
Source: Shimer (2005, Table 1)
variability of unemployment and vacancies relative to labor productivity. An important
criterion to judge the model will be whether it is able to match those data.
4.2 The cyclicality of real wages
The relationship of wages and the business cycle has received a lot of attention in the
literature. Empirical studies based on macroeconomic data usually nd that wages are
only mildly procyclical (Abraham and Haltiwanger 1995). For the time period 1951-2003,
hourly compensation and hourly labor product in the nonfarm business sector (after taking
logs and detrending) have a correlation coecient of 0.508. The regression coecient of
wages on productivity is 0.575.5 If we measure cyclicality by the correlation of wages and
unemployment, we nd that that hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector has a
correlation with the unemployment rate (detrended, but no logs) of -0.279, and a regression
coecient of -0.204: a one percentage point increase in unemployment is related to a 0.204
percent reduction in wages. Based on this nding, some recent papers (Hall (2005), among
others) have argued that the low responsiveness of real wages to aggregate productivity is
a key element in explaining the high variability of unemployment.
Studies using panel data tend to nd a stronger procyclicality of wages, partly because
they can control for the composition bias in the workforce over the cycle (Solon, Barsky,
and Parker 1994). This nding has been reinforced by recent studies which distinguish
4I omit the information on the separation rate, which is constant in my model.
5If we do the same exercise with productivity and compensation per worker, the corresponding numbers
are 0.620 and 0.578 (Rudanko (2005, Section 3) reports similar numbers). To measure the cyclicality of
wages, it makes more sense to use hourly compensation.
10the cyclicality of job stayers and job movers. Hart (2003) and Devereux and Hart (2005)
for UK data, and many studies for US data (cf. Shin and Solon (2004) and references
there) nd that the wages of workers when they change jobs are signicantly more exible
than the wages of those who stay in the same job (wages of workers who change the job
but stay in the same rm are somewhere in-between). The results summarized in Table 2
nd that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a
reduction in the real wage of male job stayers of 1{2 percent, and of male job movers of 2{3
percent. Notice that the micro-studies nd a much stronger response even for job stayers
than what we found above in the the macro data. The evidence that entry wages display
Table 2: Eect of unemployment on wages
Male Female
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
Hart (2003, Table 3) -1.22 -2.01 -1.30 -1.70
Devereux and Hart (2005, Table 3) -1.73 -2.92 -1.66 -2.49
Shin and Solon (2004, Tables 1-4)  -1.00
Notes: external movers in the case of Devereux and Hart (2005)
considerable cyclicality undermines the argument that real wage rigidity is the source of
the large unemployment uctuations, because it is the wages for new hires what determines
the rms' incentives to create vacancies. It gives a reason to look for theories that can
explain unemployment variability without resorting to wage rigidity, which is what this
paper does. The ndings also suggest some form of long-term wage contracting between
the rm and the worker, where the rm insures the worker against wage uctuations, as
long as the worker stays within the rm.
That the labor market is not a spot market where wages are renegotiated from scratch
every period is also found in a related strand of literature which identies cohort eects
in wages. The time at which a worker enters a rm or enters the labor market for the
rst time, has a persistent eect on a wage. Workers who entered in a recession will
receive lower wages than workers who entered in a boom. This eect remains even many
years after entering the rm (see for example Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstrom (1994), Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2006)). We will discuss the
ndings of the latter study in more detail in Section 5.3, where we compare it to the
implications of our model. This dierence in the dynamics of entry wages and wages of
ongoing matches is what one would expect from the theory of implicit contracts: while
they are on the same job (or at least within the same rm), workers are partially insured
by their rms against wage uctuations. New entrants, in contrast, get a higher wage in
a boom, which reects the higher discounted lifetime productivity of the match. These
ndings are interesting because the technology specication (1) potentially provides an
alternative explanation. Unemployment at the time of entry into a job may seem to cause
persistently lower wages because the jobs that are created in bad times are less productive.
11We will see whether we can distinguish this explanation from an explanation based on
long-term wage contracting.
The relationship between wages and the unemployment rate, which is the focus of
the empirical labor literature, is hard to interpret, because unemployment is endogenous.
Thinking in terms of the Mortensen/Pissarides model, it makes more sense to estimate
the responsiveness of wages to changes in labor productivity, not unemployment. In yet
preliminary work based on CPS data, Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2006) report the
elasticity of wages with respect to aggregate labor productivity. For job movers, they nd
an elasticity of about 1, while for job stayers, they nd an elasticity of about 0. This
supports the idea that entry wages, which determine the hiring incentives of rms, are
exible, while the wages of incumbents are very rigid. How this can be reconciled with the
seemingly strong reaction of the wages of job stayers to unemployment is not yet clear.
Both labor productivity and unemployment act on wages, one through the current match
surplus, the other one through the continuation value of the match. The two are strongly
correlated. Future empirical work should try to disentangle the two eects.
4.3 Parameter values
The model period is 1/48 of a year, corresponding roughly to a week. For the parameters
I use standard values from the literature. The discount rate is set to 1.2% quarterly, so
 = 0:9881=14. I use log utility, U(c) = logx. The parameter b, which captures both
unemployment benets and the value of leisure, is the key parameter that determines
the volatility of tightness and unemployment. I use 0.745 from Costain and Reiter (2003,
Table 1), which gives a realistic response of the model to long-run changes in unemployment
benets and taxation.6
For the elasticity of matches w.r.t. unemployment I use  = 0:4. This is well within
the range of values that Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, Table 3) report. With this value,
the model strikes a balance between explaining the variability of unemployment and the
variability of tightness. If I use a higher value of  as Shimer (2005) and Rudanko (2005)
do, the model tends to underestimate the variability of unemployment, and overestimate
that of tightness. In this sense, the parameter is \estimated" from the data. For the job
separation rate, some recent papers have used a value of 40% annually. Here I deviate
and rather use 25% annually,  = 0:25=48, which is closer to what earlier papers in the
matching literature have used. The main reason is that I assume in the model that technical
progress is linked to the match, not to the job, while in reality it is probably a mixture of
both. Using a separation rate of 0.4 dilutes the eect of embodied technical change too
much. The matching eciency Am is normalized to unity; this parameter only scales the
absolute number of vacancies, which is irrelevant for us. In each experiment, the vacancy
cost parameter is set such that the steady state unemployment rate is 5.67 percent, the
average in the US in the period 1951{2003.
6In the 2003 version of the paper, we considered this more of an upper bound for the parameter. Our
more recent, not yet published empirical results indicate that this parameter is our best point estimate.
12For the productivity process, I use a 9-state Markov chain. From each state, only
neighbouring states can be reached within one model period. The transition probabilities
where chosen such that in each state, the conditional expectation satises Et zt+1 = zzt,
and the conditional standard deviation is z. I choose z so as to match approximately the
quarterly autocorrelation coecient of average labor productivity (which is not equal to z
in the case z > 0) of 0.878. Average labor productivity varies somewhat with z, but I
keep the z constant at z = 0:871=12 in all simulations. The states where chosen such that
the outer points are 2:5 times the unconditional standard deviation of z. The variance
z is varied systematically to study the nonlinear eects of uctuations.
The sunk cost M of match formation is set to 0 unless stated otherwise. If cur-
rent productivity is z, to keep a match that was formed while productivity was zm we
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o
, where z is the dierence between the highest and the
lowest possible realization of z.
5 Numerical Results
5.1 Explaining Labor Market Aggregates: The Case Of Small
Shocks
We rst investigate the case where the shocks to aggregate productivity z are small. In this
way, we abstract from two issues. First, the participation constraints in (6) never bind,
such that the limited-commitment solution equals the full commitment solution, and wages
are constant over the lifetime of a match. Second, there are no endogenous separations.
Figure 1 displays results for this case, varying the parameter z between 0 and 1. The
panels on the lhs of the gure show the standard deviation of the variables, relative to the
standard deviation of aggregate labor productivity (average productivity over the cross-
section of matches). The rhs panels show the regression coecient of the same variables
on aggregate productivity, which equals the relative standard deviation of the two series
multiplied with the correlation coecient. We compare three dierent environments. First,
the model with benchmark parameters and full commitment (\FullC"). Second, the model
with short term wage contracts (continuous re-bargaining, \re-bargain"). For this model,
I use linear utility rather than log-utility. The reason is that the Nash formula (10), which
weighs the worker's surplus by the marginal utility at current wages, implies what I consider
articial uctuations in the surplus sharing if utility is nonlinear and if the wage uctuates
as strongly as it does in the model with short term contracts.7 The third version is again
with short term contracts, but assuming a very high sunk cost M of match formation,
M = 24, equal to half a year of average labor productivity (\re-b,SunkC"). The purpose
7In that case, unemployment uctuations would be about 10 percent higher than what they are in the
graph.
13here is to study whether sunk costs have important eects on the dynamics of the model.
Four results stand out. First, the bargaining framework has almost no eect on un-
employment and tightness, it only aects the dynamics of wages. This is in line with the
results in Rudanko (2005). Second, the variability of average wages tends to be too big in
the model with continuous re-bargaining, and too small in the model with wage contracts.
Again, this is similar to what Rudanko nds. Third, the sunk cost has only a small eect
on wage dynamics, and virtually no eect on unemployment and tightness. Fourth, and
most importantly, the model can replicate the high volatility of unemployment and tight-
ness if we pick the right z. What the right z is depends on which aspects of the data
we want to match. Shimer (2005) implicitly requires the model to replicate the volatility
of labor market data (left panels), while Mortensen and Nagypal (2005, p.8) and Rudanko
(2005, p.21) suggest that the model should only explain the part of the volatility in the
data that is related to the movements of aggregate labor productivity (right panels). To
match the rst target, we need z  0:65, for the second target we need z  0:28.
5.2 Big Shocks and Endogenous Separations
Figure 2 shows results for the case z = 0:28, computed for dierent variances of the
aggregate shock z. This illustrates the nonlinear eects that the variance of shocks has on
the dynamics of the model. On the x-axis we now have the standard deviation of average
labor productivity (in the following denoted by aveZ), which equals 0.02 in the data
(Table 1). Notice that average labor productivity diers from z in the case of z > 0, such
that aveZ is an equilibrium outcome. We compare three dierent contracting frameworks.
The model with continuous re-bargaining allows for endogenous separations. It turns out
that they are very rare here, so that we do not see their eects in the gure. The solutions
with full commitment (\FullC,SunkC") and with 1-sided commitment (\1LimC,SunkC")
include a small sunk cost that prevents all endogenous separations. The sunk cost is set
as explained in Section 4.3, and is maximally 2.3 weeks of production.
By our choice of z, the variability of unemployment and tightness is much lower than
in the data (lhs panels), but the elasticity w.r.t. z is approximately right (rhs panels). We
see that the nonlinear eect of aveZ on the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies is
small. A higher variance of shocks increases the relative variance of wages, because the
participation constraint now starts to bind in some states, and rms have to adjust wages
to prevent workers from quitting. However, this eect is not very big at the levels of aveZ
that we consider. The variability of average wages under one-sided limited commitment
solution is twice of what it is under full commitment, but it still falls short of the variability
(elasticity w.r.t. productivity) that we observe in the data. I report results here for the
case of one-sided commitment, because it is much faster to solve than the model with
limited commitment on both sides, and the results are very similar. For example, in the
case of Figure 2, with the highest aveZ, the relative standard deviation of average wages
is 0.3677 for one-sided commitment, and 0.3693 with limited commitment. The dierences
in the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies are even smaller.
Figure 3 shows the same information for the case z = 0:65. Endogenous separation
14is now a serious problem for the re-bargaining model. When it kicks in, the variability
of unemployment goes up sharply (left panel). However, from the right panel we see
that the negative correlation of unemployment with labor productivity disappears. This
is because in times of high productivity, there is massive endogenous separation, leading
to temporary spikes in unemployment. This is counterfactual. The full commitment and
one-sided commitment solutions in the gure escape this problem by imposing suciently
high sunk costs.8 If one accepts these costs (which are up to half a year of production!), the
model is successful in matching the very high uctuation of unemployment and vacancies.
Even the variability of average wages is similar to what we nd in the data, due to the
high variability of entry wages.
To summarize, the model has no problem in explaining the systematic part (elasticity
w.r.t. z) of unemployment and vacancies. The parameter values to achieve this cause
only small levels of endogenous separations. A higher value of z can be used to generate
unconditional variances of unemployment and vacancies as high as in the data, but drastic
measures must be taken to prevent massive endogenous separations with counterfactual
implications for the correlation of unemployment and labor productivity.
5.3 The Dynamics Of Wages
The conclusion from Figures 1 and 2 was that the variability of average wages tends to
be too big in the model with continuous re-bargaining, and too small in the model with
wage contracts. Figure 4 breaks this down into the movements of entry wages, wages of
job stayers and average wages. The lhs panels show the elasticity of wages w.r.t. labor
productivity, which is the natural thing to look at from an RBC perspective. The rhs
panels show the elasticity of wages w.r.t. unemployment, which is what the bulk of the
labor literature has focussed on. In Figure 4 we use z = 0:28, which appears to be the
most plausible parameter value from the results above.
We conrm again that continuous re-bargaining generates wages that are too volatile,
no matter whether we look at job stayers or movers. Let us therefore focus on long-term
contracts. Then the elasticities w.r.t. labor productivity are in line with what Haefke,
Sonntag, and van Rens (2006) report: about zero elasticity for job stayers, unit elasticity
for new jobs. However, this conicts with the evidence on average wages coming from
aggregate data, where we found an elasticity of 0.575, much higher than predicted by the
model.
Concerning the relationship of wages and unemployment, the model predicts a regres-
sion coecient between -2 and -3 for job movers (\entry wage"), which ts nicely with the
microeconometric evidence reported in Table 2. The regression coecient for job stayers,
however, was about -1 in the data and is close to 0 in the model. Again there is a discrep-
ancy between micro- and macro data, but this time in the other direction. In the macro
8Notice that the issue of sunk costs vs. endogenous separation has nothing to do with the type of wage
bargaining. I demonstrate the eects of endogenous separation in the case of continuous re-bargaining
rather than in the case of long-term contracts, because it is easier to solve.
15data, the regression coecient of average wages on unemployment was only -0.204, which
is in line with the predictions of the model.
All in all, the success of the model in explaining wages is not completely clear. Let us
therefore bring in some further piece of evidence, what the labor literature calls \cohort
eects" on wages. I focus on the recent results in Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz
(2006), who use a very comprehensive data set on Canadian college graduates in the 1980s
and 1990s. They show that the cyclical conditions at the time a worker enters the labor
market (graduates from college) has a persistent eect on wages. This eect is measured
by a regression of log wages on the unemployment rate at the time of graduation. The
regression controls for the unemployment rate of all years between graduation and the
present day.
To compare these results with the model, I generate a panel of worker lifes from the
model simulations. When the worker gets her rst job, I interpret this as \entering the
labor market". Then I follow this worker over the next 10 years, and see how the wage she
gets (either in the initial job, or another job after an unemployment spell) depends on the
initial unemployment rate. More precisely, I estimate the following regression, separately
for each E = 0;:::;10:
logwi;t+E = c +
E X
j=0
e;jUt+j + i;t+E (25)
Here, t is the time when worker i enters the labor market, E (\experience") denotes the
time passed since entering the market, wi;t+E denotes the wage of the worker (wage of
that week, conditional on the worker being employed), and Ut+E is the unemployment rate
(the average unemployment rate over the relevant year). Figure 5 reports the parameter
estimate e;0, which measures the eect of the initial unemployment rate, controlling for
the history of aggregate unemployment over the working experience of the worker. The line
\data" refers to the results in Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2006, Table 1,Col. 1).
In the upper panel we see that a model with continuous Nash bargaining fails completely
to explain the observed pattern. At labor market entry, the model grossly overestimates
the eect of the unemployment rate, which is in line with our earlier ndings. The next
year already, the eect of the initial unemployment rate disappears, since the wage is
re-bargained, and the current unemployment rate is controlled for in the regression. In
contrast, the model with long-term contracts ts the data surprisingly well. The reduction
in the impact of initial unemployment has a simple explanation in the model: a fraction of
worker loose their job and nd a new one, and in the new job the wage is negotiated afresh.
In the data there may be some persistency of the wage even for job movers, but Oreopoulos,
von Wachter, and Heisz (2006, p.26) nd that changing employers is an important reason
why workers starting in bad cyclical conditions catch up over time. The results for z = 0
are very similar to those of z = 0:28. With z = 0:28, the variance of both wages and
unemployment is more than twice as large as with z = 0, but the regression coecient
does not change substantially. The fading eect of unemployment on wages comes from
job separation, in both cases.
16Let us summarize the ndings. More than the standard model, the model with embod-
ied technical change z > 0 implies excessive volatility of real wages. To solve this problem,
we have to introduce long-term wage contracts. Under this specication, the model ts
well a number of stylized facts: that entry wages are more volatile than average wages,
the elasticity of wages w.r.t. labor productivity, the relationship between unemployment
and entry wages as well as the cohort eects that were found in the labor literature. What
the model has diculties to cope with is the cyclicality of the wages of job stayers, which
seems stronger in the data than in the model. Shin and Solon (2004) nd that much of
this variability has to do with overtime pay and bonuses. It is plausible that rms, while
insuring their workers against exogenous uctuations, still use changes in wages to provide
extra incentives. Then we need a more sophisticated model of long-term wage contracts.
6 Conclusions
The results in this paper have shown that the technological specication (1) helps to bring
the standard labor market matching model in line with the data. Without resorting to
any exogenous rigidities, the model explains the high variability of vacancies, job nding
probabilities and the unemployment rate. The version with long-term wage contracting
explains the the low volatility of the average wage, and the fact that wages of newly formed
matches uctuate more than average wages.
I conclude that Hypothesis 1 deserves closer investigation. Future work should improve
on the present, very simple model in a number of ways. First, a better model would take
endogenous separation seriously. The evidence from Bowlus (1995) indicates that people
do quit jobs that were formed in recessions more frequently. This eect must be dampened,
however, to avoid unrealistic spikes in unemployment. More generally, one should allow
for heterogenous job separation probabilities. Some jobs were never meant to last long,
while others are intended to be permanent jobs. Since the persistency of jobs relative to
the persistency of aggregate productivity is crucial in generating unemployment volatility,
it may be important to model this more carefully. A likely implication of the theory would
be that the probability to nd the kind of jobs that are long-lived uctuates more strongly
than the probability for short-term jobs. It may also be worthwhile to distinguish between
job quality and match quality, allowing for a match to separate and the rm hanging on to
a valuable vacancy. If this happens in equilibrium, it complicates the model signicantly,
since one has to keep track of the cross-sectional distribution of valuable vacancies in the
economy.
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Figure 1: Model results for small shocks; mean of 100 simulations over 53 years, HP-ltered
with  = 105















































































































































Figure 2: Model results with z = 0:28; mean of 100 simulations over 53 years, HP-ltered
with  = 105















































































































































Figure 3: Model results with z = 0:65; mean of 100 simulations over 53 years, HP-ltered
with  = 105



















































































































Figure 4: Model results with z = 0:28; mean of 100 simulations over 53 years, HP-ltered
with  = 105






























































Figure 5: Inuence of unemployment rate at time of labor market entry on wages, z = 0:28
24